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Abstract 
We bring new evidence to bear on McCloskey's argument that farmers in the open 
fields reduced risk by scattering their land holdings. The new evidence is the grain output 
from a number of plots of land in two French villages, Onnaing and Quarouble, dming 
the years 1701-1790. When combined with prices and wages, the output figures provide 
financial returns for each plot of land, and financial theory then allows us to construct 
land portfolios that minimize portfolio variance for a given mean return. The virtue 
of using returns (rather than simple output correlations) is that the returns take into 
account the price fluctuations farmers encountered. They also allow us to distinguish 
the benefits of scattering from those produced by crop diversification and they do so 
with greater accuracy than the output figures. In the end, the returns demonstrate that 
scattering of land holdings provided relatively little insurance. The real reduction in 
risk came not from scattering but from the diversification across crops inherent in the 
three-field system. 
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1 Introduction 
In a celebrated series of articles, Donald McCloskey has sought to elucidate the most 
puzzling mystery of medieval and early modern agriculture-the scattered holdings that 
prevailed across the open fields of northern Europe. While historians had long invoked 
population growth, inheritance laws, the difficulties of plowing, or a primeval spirit of 
egalitarianism to explain why peasants dispersed their holdings throughout the open 
fields, McCloskey argued that the practice served as insurance against agricultural risk. 
In the jargon of finance, the scattered plots of land were a diversified portfolio that 
protected a peasant against weather, pests, and natural disasters. A strip of land in a 
damp hollow might bear fruit in searing drought, while one on a sunny hillside might do 
so in frost or flood. Still others might let crops survive locusts or hail. For a cautious 
peasant, dispersing plots of land must have seemed a better strategy than risking hunger 
when the harvest dipped perilously low .1 
The virtue of McCloskey's argument is that it accounts for a major obstacle to techno-
logical change. To be sure, the open fields were far from universal in Europe, particularly 
before the later Middle Ages, and the rigidity of open field farming should not be exag-
gerated. Grain yields did improve on the open fields; farming practices on them-contrary 
to what is often assumed- were not always hemmed in by unyielding regulation. 2 Even 
*We wish to thank Lance Davis for his comments. 
1 McCloskey 1972, 1975, 1976, 1989, 1991. 
2Recent work by both historians and archaeologists suggests that although the scattered fields and 
open field farming date quite far back in some places (as in parts of England) they were by and large 
an invention of the later Middle Ages; even then they were unknown in much of Europe (Rosener [1986] 
pp. 57-61, 130; Chapelot and Fossier [1985] pp. 50, 170-174; Abel [1978] pp. 19-20, 73-83). Grain yields 
apparently rose on English open fields (Allen and 0 Grada [1988]; Yelling [1977] pp. 146-173). The yield 
figures herei though, a.re somewhat controversial; for the controversy, see Allen (1988], Overton [1979, 
1984], Turner [1982, 1984]. As for the regulation of open field farming, it is often assumed that the 
grazing rights and the communal crop rotations associated "\vith the open fields restricted innovation, 
but such "\Vas not the case, for exa1nple, in inuch of France; see the masterful discussion in Meuvret 
[1977-88] (2 (Texte): 11-46). Moreover, it was quite possible to have open fields and scattered holdings 
without either grazing rights or communal crop rotations: Thirsk [1964]. 
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so, there is no denying that the scattered plots exacted a heavy toll, particularly in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They exacerbated strife between neighbors and 
forced farmers to adopt defense practices that left everyone worse off. They bred strate-
gic behavior that blocked improvements such as drainage, and they so complicated the 
tasks of planting, grazing, or harvesting that new crops and innovative practices were 
discouraged. 3 
In a discipline as contentious as economic history, it is perhaps not surprising that Mc-
Closkey's argument, despite its merits, has never convinced all the practitioners. Scholars 
trained as traditional historians have-long ·remained skeptical, and among those schooled 
as economists, several (most notably Stefano Fenoaltea) have devised intriguing alterna· 
tive explanations.4 The resulting controversy has never died clown, in large part because 
both McCloskey and his critics lacked the sort of evidence that would settle the debate. 
They lacked it for an obvious reason: it seemed impossible to find. Yet the necessary 
evidence does exist, and we have found it, or at least something close to it. We can 
therefore put McCloskey's reasoning to the test and do so with tools more powerful than 
those McCloskey himself employed. 
2 The Evidence from Onnaing and Quarouble 
McCloskey's story revolves about the variance of grain yields, grain being the major crop 
on the open fields. Bad weather, pests, and natural disasters caused yields to swing wildly, 
but a peasant could reduce the variation by scattering his holdings to take advantage of 
microclimates and local differences in the incidence of plant disease and other calamities. 
Conceivably, he might even be able to the reduce the variance of his grain output to that 
of the village as a whole. 
For this story to work, though, requires that the yields on separate strips of land 
in the village not be too closely correlated, for if the yields on separate strips do rise 
a.nd fall together, then scattering provides no insurance and no compensation for the 
burden of farming dispersed holdings. Nearly the whole argument, a.t lea.st in McCloskey's 
formulation, therefore depends on the correlation between yields on different plots within 
the typical open field village. McCloskey ma.inta.ins that this correlation -call it R- was, 
for typical plots, probably a.bout 0.60, but he admits that the evidence is far from perfect. 5 
Since medieval and early modern farmers did not record the grain produced on ea.ch 
individual strip of land, McCloskey is forced to rely on evidence from nineteenth-century 
3See Ault [1972]; Meuvret [1977-88], vol. 2 ( Texte): 38, 107-108; and Hoffman [1988]. There is 
abundant evidence of the disputes brought on by scattering in nineteenth-century France, where, because 
the loser paid the winner's legal fees, the costs of litigation could exceed the value of the land fought 
over: Hottenger [nd], [France] Ministere des finances [1891], and Boulay [1902]. 
4For one historian's skepticis1n, see Wilson [1977], p. 37. For Fenoaltea's views, see his 1nost recent 
contribution to the debate (Fenoaltea [1988]), which contains an excellent summary of the literature on 
the open fields. 
5McCloskey [1989], pp. 39-43; [1976], pp. 145-53. 
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agronomy experiments and from the records of manorial farms in order to estimate R. 
Neither source is entirely reliable. 
The agronomy experiments correlate yields on individual plots of land, but since they 
involve late nineteenth-century methods of cultivation, they make for a rather strained 
comparison with medieval and early modern farming, as McCloskey himself acknowledges. 
If one were to overlook such difficulties and simply extend the experimental correlations 
back into the past, then R would be perhaps 0.80 or so, a dauntingly high correlation. 
McCloskey argues, not unpersuasively, that this is merely an upper bound for R, because 
the experimenters carefully controlled·the methods of cultivation and thereby eliminated 
sources of variation among plots. But the variation among the plots may also have been 
reduced by the very different agricultural techniques utilized in open field farming. 6 If 
so, then R may have indeed been as high as .80. 
The evidence from the manorial records is also imperfect. It concerns, not the indi-
vidual strips of land within a single village, but entire farms located in separate villages. 
The problem here is the distance between the farms: because they lay in separate com-
munities, the distance between them was far greater than that between typical strips 
in a single village's open fields. Unfortunately, the distance and the output correlation 
are related. As the distance between manorial farms increases, the output correlation 
falls; presumably, the correlation R between typical strips does the same. McCloskey 
is therefore forced to extrapolate from the distance-correlation relationship for manorial 
farms in order to estimate R for strips, but even though he restricts himself to nearby 
farms, he is still dealing with properties that are much further apart than the strips in an 
open field village. His extrapolation is thus quite risky; as he himself admits (McCloskey 
[1989] pp 40-41 ), the 0.60 estimate for R that he derives from the extrapolation "may be 
too low to represent the correlation facing a peasant in one open field in a village." 
What we need, obviously, are yields from plots of land that are much closer together-
precisely the evidence that seems impossible to find. Yet such evidence does exist and 
we have located it, surprisingly, in published documents. It comes from the unusual tithe 
records unearthed by Marineau for his study of the evolution of French grain yields. 7 The 
6McCloskey [1989] (pp. 39-40). The common practice of sowing maslin (mixed rye and wheat) was 
but one technique of traditional open field farming that reduced the variation in yields among plots. 
One reason farmers planted inaslin \:Vas that the sturdier stalks of rye prevented the wind and rain fro1n 
beating do\vn the fragile vvheat. The maslin would therefore diminish yield variations due to differences 
in exposure among plots. See Meuvret [1977-88], vol. l(Texte): 148, and passim, for this and other 
techniques of plowing, so\ving, and harvesting that 1night have also lessened the variation a1nong plots. 
7Morineau [1971], pp. 32-35, 97-162. His evidence comes from the Archives departementales du Nord 
in Lille [henceforth AD Nord], 4 G 3456-3457, 5379-5731, which we have also examined. Though rare, 
similar sources can occasionally be found in tithe records and in the documents concerning seigneurial 
dues such as the chainpart, but they always seem to lack the virtues of Morineau's docu1nents. Whereas 
his sources track grain yields on separate parcels of land for centuries, most other records stop after 
a short time or make it exceedingly difficult to follow the yield on the same parcel of land. That '\Vas 
the case, for example, with the champart records in the Archives departementales du Calvados (Caen), 
H 2873- 2874, and Yrith those in the A.rchivcs dCpartcmcntalcs des Yvclincs (\Tcrsaillcs), 55 J 348-351. 
Other sorts of documents that \Yould shed light on scattering are also rare-in particular, evidence that 
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records in question concern the tithe levied by the Cathedral of Cambrai in two northern 
French villages, Onnaing and Quarouble. Located only 4 kilometers outside the city of 
Valenciennes, the two villages were adjacent, their centers a mere 2 kilometers apart. 
The villages and their environs (pa.rt of the area known as the Ha.ina.ult) had come to the 
classic three-field crop rotation rather late in the Middle Ages, but the three-field regime 
was certainly established by the sixteenth century, as were the hallmarks of open-field 
farming, including grazing on the stubble. The region was also one of scattered holdings, 
with typical plots measuring between roughly 0.1 and 1.0 hectares. 8 
The Cathedral possessed the rightAo an 8~percent tithe on certain parcels of land 
known as taques in Onnaing and Quarouble. There were 27 of the taques, covering 
49 percent of the surface of Onna.ing and 39 percent of Quarouble. Unlike most tithe 
owners, who leased their tithe rights out for a fixed cash rent over a number of years, 
the Cathedral of Ca.mbrai insisted on collecting its tithe in kind one year at a time, and 
it did so separately for ea.ch ta.que. By the eighteenth century, the process of collection 
had settled down to a routine. On the eve of the harvest, the cathedral would auction 
off the right to collect the tithe on each ta.que to the highest bidder, with bids made not 
in money, but in grain-wheat if the standing crop on the taque was wheat, oats if it was 
oats. The highest bidder had the right to 8 percent of the crop on the ta.que after the 
grain farmers had harvested it; he owed the Cathedral either the a.mount of grain he had 
bid or a cash payment equal to the bid times the post harvest price of grain in nearby 
Va.lenciennes, where his payment was due.9 
In the eighteenth century it was the cash that changed hands, although the Cathedral 
continued to insist on bids in kind.1° The bidders were by and large residents of Onnaing 
and Quarouble, presurnably farm owners whose workers were already out in the fields 
operating farms (as opposed to ovvned far1n land) were actually scattered. Lando\vnership \Vas certainly 
scattered1 but whether the operating far1ns were is not clear, because the rental inarket could have 
rearranged holdings considerably. 
8 Sivery [1977) (pp. 88-89, 98-106, 112, 132); Morineau [1971) (pp. 34, 98); Lefebvre [1959) (pp. 47, 
90-91, 210-217); Demangeon [1905] (pp. 345-57). We do not want to suggest that the local agriculture 
\Vas rigid and baclc\vards. By the end of the eighteenth century, for example, local farn1ers had adopted 
a nu1nber of progressive techniques, such as the planting of clover, the preparation of seed \vi th arsenic, 
the use of a wide variety of fertilizers, and intensive hand cultivation of small plots. 
9 Archives Departementales du Nord, 4 G 3456; Morineau [1971], pp. 32-35, 97-162. The cash 
payments were based on the N ove1nber 30 price for \vheat and the Christmas price for oats-the dates 
when the wheat and oats payments were due in Valenciennes. In addition to the tithe rights on the 27 
taques, the Cathedral possessed si1nilar rights on parcels known as the espiliers. Areas are not available 
for the espiliers, in contra.st to the taques, but the espiliers appear to have been smaller bits of dispersed 
land, sometimes outside the usual crop rotation. In the eighteenth century the espiliers produced 25 to 
30 percent of the total tithe income from both taques and espiliers: Morineau [1971], p. 98. We will use 
the espiliers for some but not all of our calculations below. 
10The Cathedral considered switching to long-term cash leases at the end of the Old Regime, but the 
Revolution cut short the project: Morineau [1971), p. 100-102. It probably adhered to the in-kind bids, 
even though the tithe was actually paid in cash, because it wished to protect its tithe rights against legal 
attack. When in-kind seigneurial dues were let out on long term cash leases in the region of Onnaing 
and Quarouble, the lease sometimes paved the way for a legal argument that the rights to the dues 
themselves had lapsed; the Cathedral might have feared the same fate for its tithe rights if they were 
leased for cash. See Lefebvre [1959], p. 148-50. The eighteenth-century auctions stipulated that the 
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bringing their own harvested grain into local barns. For them the marginal cost of hauling 
in a little additional grain from the taques was low, all the more so since they probably bid 
on the taques where their own crop stood. With the marginal cost of bringing the tithe in 
near zero, it is reasonable to assume that the highest bidder would offer an amount equal 
to 8 percent of the quantity of grain standing on the taque. Such an argument assumes, 
of course, that competition among the bidders would drive their profits down to zero, 
but the bidders were numerous and no one seemed to monopolize the tithe collection. 
On July 26, 1707, for example, the cathedral auctioned off the right to the tithe on 7 
taques planted in wheat and 11 planted in oats to a total of 21 high bidders - usually, a 
separate high bidder for each taque. 11 
The winning bids thus furnish an estimate of 8 percent of the grain output on each 
taque. But what precisely were the taques? Averaging 41 hectares in size, they were 
too large to be individual strips of land. Rather, each taque was a group of adjacent 
strips, all sown with the same crops and in all likelihood ploughed in parallel-what was 
termed a furlong in England, or a quartier or delle, to cite but two of the common 
names in other parts of France. Indeed, on occasion the Cathedral even called the taques 
"quartiers." Each taque therefore included the holdings of a number of individuals and 
each was planted with a single crop or left fallow in any given year. The crop would of 
course change with the three-field rotation, shifting from wheat to oats and then to fallow 
before beginning the cycle anew. In turn, each taque belonged to one of the three larger 
land units in each village that made up the three field system - units called great fields 
in England and known in Raina.ult as royages. Each royage included all the taques and 
other parcels that were sown with the same crop and moved through the crop rotation 
together. 12 
tithe be levied in kind and that bids be 111ade in kind, but final pay1nent had to be in cash: AD Nord, 
4 G 3456. 
11 AD Nord 1 4 G 3456, July 26, 1'707, and passi1n; because a few of the tithe rights -i,.vere won by joint 
bidders, there vtere more high bidders than taques. Conceivably, one individual could have monopolized 
collection of the tithe on ea.ch taque, but a perusal of the eighteenth-century auction records suggests 
that was not the case. Unfortunately, the auction records do not list the number of individuals who bid 
for each taque, but rviorineau argues that it 'i.Va.s probably large because nun1erous individuals usually 
had holdings on each taque: Morineau [1971], p. 34, 102. For evidence that the high bidders were 
local farmers, see ibid, p. 102, and AD Nord, 4 G 3456, July 9, 1784, where all 11 of the high bidders 
for taques in Onnaing i,vere fro1n Onnaing, and all 9 in Qua.rouble were from Qua.rouble. Presumably 
bidders would have adjusted their bids slightly to reflect the difference between the farm gate price and 
the Valenciennes price for grain, but this adjustment can be safely ignored because Valenciennes was a 
mere 4 kilometers a\vay. It also see1ns reasonable to ignore the risks involved in the collection process. 
They were minimal-the grain was ready for harvest and the bidders did not have to guess the future 
price of grain-and \Vi th a. handful of risk neutral bidders the auction should have soon pushed very close 
to eight percent of the grain on the taque. 
12For the size of the taques, see the corrected areas in Morineau [1982] 2:625-643. For the use of the 
word "quartiers" to describe the taques, see AD Nord, 4 G 3442, and for the peculiar ineaning of the 
word royage in Hainault, see Godefroy, Dictionnaire du fran~ais niidiival, s.v. "royage". One taque, 
kno\vn as Dessous-la-Crete, see1ned to have t\vo parts: 35 hectares in the first royage in Onnaing and 20 
hectares in the second royage in Onnaing. Each part was counted for our purposes as a separate taque. 
All areas here concern only the taques and not the additional parcels knovvn as espiliers, for which no 
areas are available. 
5 
1¥ithout a map, we cannot tell how close the taques were, nor whether the ones in 
a given royage happened to be nearer than the others. Unfortunately, no suitable map 
depicts the taques, but whatever their location in Onnaing and Quarouble, they had to 
be closer than McC!oskey's manorial farms. The distance between two taques located 
within one of the villages would be comparable to that between individual strips, and 
even if we took one taque in Onnaing and a second in Quarouble, the distance would be 
relatively small. The two villages, after all, were only 2 kilometers apart, whereas few of 
McCloskey's farms stood within 3 kilometers of one another. Indeed, the closest of his 
farms were 2.4 kilometers apart-further than Onnaing and Quarouble.13 
Correlating the grain output of all the taques over a number of years provides us with 
an estimate for R. To be sure, such a calculation raises certain questions. In the first 
place, for some taques, the winning bidder had to pay a small, fixed amount of grain to 
the local priest; for such taques, the winning bid and hence the assumed grain output 
would be artificially reduced each year by the same small constant. Yet although the 
grain output would be a bit lower, the correlations between the grain output of different 
taques would not be affected, for subtracting a constant would leave the correlations 
unchanged. 
A second problem is that the winning bids involve the bidder's estimate of the grain 
output, an estim.ate that was undoubtedly made with error. Unlike the subtraction of a 
constant, the error would affect the calculation of R. If the actual time series of grain 
outputs for taque i is y; and the time series derived from the winning bids is x;, then: 
x;=y;+e; (1) 
where e; is the error resulting from the use of the winning bids. If the e; are independent 
of the Yi and one another - a reasonable assumption - then: 
cov(y;, Yj) < cov(y;, Yj) 
((u;; + u'fJ(u;, + u'f,))~ O"y;O"y; (2) 
The value of R derived from the winning bids is the expression on the left of (2) averaged 
over all pairs of taques, while the true R is the average of the expression on the right of 
(2). 
The bids therefore lead to an underestimate of R, though by only a small margin 
because the errors e; are likely to be tiny. After all, the farmers who bid on the tithe knew 
13McCloskey, [1989] pp. 40-43. So as to be consistent with McCloskey, the distance between Onnaing 
and Quarouble is 1neasured here as the distance bet\veen their centers. Old-Regime 1naps of Onnaing and 
Qua.rouble, 1vhich one \Vould expect to show the taques, concern only 1neadows) woods, and adjoining 
land, not the whole villages: AD Nord, 4 G 3454, 3510, 3520. The Cathedral's eighteenth-century terrier 
did list the taques, but unlike some terriers of the period, it lacked maps: AD Nord, 4 G 3442. Tax 
records are of no help either: right through the Revolution they too lacked maps. One could consult the 
nineteenth-century cadastre-it was unfortunately not available to researchers during our stay at the AD 
Nord-but that i.vould be of little help, for even if holdings had not been consolidated, the taques would 
have disappeared and all one could do \vould be to reason by analogy with quartier names. Cf. Lefebvre 
[1959], pp. xvii-xxi, for what one can expect of the documents in the region. 
6 
well how to estimate the amount of grain standing in a field. They made such estimates 
frequently, not only when they bid on the tithe but when they evaluated relatives' estates 
or testified in court. The errors they made - the ei - would be minor. Vve can reduce 
the magnitude of the errors even further if we restrict ourselves-as we shall-to the tithe 
records of the eighteenth century, when the delay between the tithe auction and the 
actual harvest was at most a matter of days. In earlier centuries, the tithe rights were 
sold off in May or June, but in the eighteenth century the auctions took place in July, 
the month when harvesting began. In 1707, for instance, the tithe was auctioned off on 
July 26, perhaps moments before the onset of the harvest.14 
Under such conditions the errors e; were in all likelihood minuscule. Suppose, for 
example, that they were normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 
equal to 10 percent of the average yield on a taque. Under these assumptions, the 
winning bidders would be within 20 percent of the true yield roughly 95 percent of 
the time-hardly unreasonable accuracy for experienced bidders competing against one 
another only a day or two, or perhaps even hours, before the harvest. Equation (2) then 
implies that we underestimate R by only 15 percent. 15 
McCloskey's R concerns a single crop, and we shall limit ourselves to calculating it for 
wheat. 16 The calculation entails correlating wheat yields from the eighteenth century for 
each pair of taques that grew wheat simultaneously and then averaging the correlations 
over all the pairs. The correlations also permit a test of another of McCloskey's ideas, 
for if he is correct, then the correlations should decline with the distance between taques. 
The precise distance between each pair of taques remains unknown, but we can at least 
distinguish those pairs with both taques in the same village, which would have been 
closer on average than the pairs spanning both Onnaing and Qua.rouble. Presumably, 
their correlations would be higher too. 
What then do the correlations reveal? When both taques lay in the same village, R 
was a low 0.473(Table1). For the pairs spanning the two villages, it was lower still-0.386-
just as McCloskey's relationship between yield correlations and distance would suggest. 
Nor does the smaller R for taques in different villages appear to be a statistical fluke-or 
14Morineau [1971], pp. 100-104; AD Nord, 4 G 3456. A second reason for restricting the analysis 
to the years 1701-1790 is that before the eighteenth century the tithe rights were sometimes sold for 
several years at a time and the pay1nents subsequently reduced in case of disaster. One additional cause 
for worry-as it turns out, a groundless one-is the accuracy of Morineau's publication of the original 
figures fro1n Onnaing and Qua.rouble. Morineau's calculations \vith the data have been attacked as 
inaccurate, and one might therefore v.rorry about the accuracy of his publication1 which \Ve relied upon 
for our calculations. While his arith1netic may have contained errors 1 a co1nparison with the original 
manuscript sources suggests that the raw published data itself was transcribed with reasonable accuracy. 
We have, however 1 converted "\Vhat appear to be the decimal tenths in his tables to the eights they actually 
are. 
15This calculation uses the coefficient of variation of the winning bids - in other words, the standard 
deviation of Xi in equation (1) divided by its mean. When estimated by averaging over all the taques 
and espiliers 1 the coefficient of variation turns out to be 0.275. The calculation here concerns eighteenth-
century wheat yields only. 
16McCloskey does consider correlations betv..reen different crops, but it is the single crop R that is 
"critical.": [1976], 132-36, 145. 
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at least that is what is suggested by a regression of the correlations on a constant and 
a dummy variable for taques lying in the same village.17 Since Onnaing and Quarouble 
are only 2 kilometers apart, the lower R for taques spanning the two villages is probably 
the figure relevant to open field agriculture. The pairs of taques that lay within the 
same village and grew wheat at the same time were necessarily in the same royage and 
thus perhaps closer than individual strips needed to be, particularly if the royage was 
compact. The pairs that spanned the two villages, by contrast, were probably no further 
apart than typical peasant holdings. 
With-such a low R; even Ia-rge errms in-the bidders' estimates of the yields would be 
unlikely to raise R to unsettling levels. If the bidders' errors had a standard deviation 
of 15 percent of the crop-incredible sloppiness, given the circumstances-then the true R 
would be 0.548, or 0.672 if we were to utilize the higher, though somewhat less reasonable, 
estimate based on taques in the same village. If they erred with a standard deviation 
of 10 percent-and they probably achieved greater accuracy than that- then the true R 
would be 0.444 or 0.54,1, depending on which estimate of R we used. 18 All of the figures 
are obviously low, most even lying below McCloskey's own estimates. His argument, 
apparently, is vindicated on all counts, but before judging the debate closed, we should 
analyze the evidence in a different way, for as we shall see, the simple output correlations 
for a single crop conceal far more than they reveal. 
3 A Portfolio Analysis 
Several questions remain unanswered. First, how do we judge whether R is low enough? 
Equivalently, how do we gauge the effectiveness of the insurance that scattering provides? 
McCloskey did so in a relatively simple way, by measuring how much scattering reduced 
the likelihood of disaster, which he defined as a crop equal to half the normal.19 But the 
likelihood of disaster is not the only yardstick for evaluating insurance. It might suit a 
world of self sufficient farmers, but such a world, if it ever existed, was long gone from 
Western European agriculture by the early modern period. By the eighteenth century, for 
example, most peasants in the Hainault-the region of Onnaing and Qua.rouble-worked 
as agricultural la.borers. Perhaps only 1 or 2 percent of them were independent. 20 The 
independent ones were by and large engaged in commercial agriculture, and they might 
well prosper when the harvest fell to half the normal, because of the inelastic demand 
17If r is the yield correlation calculated from the winning bids for a pair of taques and z is a dun11ny 
variable that is 1 when both taques lie in the same village, then r = .386 + .087 z (n = 224, R 2 = .03) and 
the t-statistic of z's coefficient is 2.69. The t-statistic assumes, of course, that the pairs of taques within 
a single village and the pairs spanning two villages have observed yield correlations that are normally 
distributed with the sa111e variance but different means. All yield correlations here use data both fron1 
the taques and from the parcels known as espiliers. 
18Because yields rose in the eighteenth century, the output series were non stationary. As a result, 
the correlations here may actually overstate the relationship between output on different taques. For 
further discussion, see below. 
19McCloskey [1976], pp. 131-32, 143. 
20Lefebvre [1959], pp. 37, 289. 
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for grain. Only the farm laborers would suffer, but they had little or no land to scatter 
anyway. 
The evidence from other parts of Europe is similar. Self sufficiency, even in the 
late Middle Ages, was surprisingly rare; many peasants hired labor and marketed their 
crops. Furthermore, even self sufficient peasants might have defined disaster differently 
or reacted to it in different ways. 21 
What we need, therefore, is a more supple yardstick, one that takes into account the 
costs.,and profits .of farming and .allows.Jor differences in wealth and in aversion to risk. 
One obvious technique is to rely upon portfolio analysis from the field of finance. The 
early modern landholder's problem could be rephrased as that of choosing an optimal 
portfolio of land holdings based on the expected financial returns from farming and their 
variances. Of course such a portfolio analysis entails certain theoretical assumptions-none 
more drastic though than McCloskey's focus on averting disaster-and to a historian it 
may seem a.nachronistic when applied to the world of early modern landholders. 22 But it 
is, after all, merely a model, a way of thinking about the problem-our way of thinking, 
rather than theirs-which can nevertheless shed light on the difficulties they faced. While 
it might not be reality as perceived by the landholders, it could well reveal the advantages 
that they discerned in scattering their holdings. And as we shall see, it has the great 
advantage of permitting comparison with other available forms of insurance. 
The portfolio analysis requires time series of financial returns for each parcel or field 
where the landholder might own land - for example, each taque. The output of each 
parcel is not enough, for we need to know what the financial return to farming each 
parcel is, returns after the crops are sold and the labor paid. If we only examine output 
fluctuations, as McCloskey does, then we merely take into account the risks affecting 
physical output, but we ignore the changes in wages and prices, which, given inelastic 
demand, might have compensated the landholder for a drop in output. If we calculate 
returns, the price changes are obviously taken into account. 23 
The portfolio analysis also resolves a more vexing problem with the output series. The 
problem is that average grain yields changed over time in Onnaing and Qua.rouble; in 
particular, they rose in the eighteenth century. It is therefore difficult to derive reliable 
estimates of R from the output series, because the output correlations confound the 
short term fluctuations of output that interest us with the long term change in yields. In 
technical terms, the output series are not stationary and they give inconsistent estimates 
21 For a discussion, see Newberry and Stiglitz (1981]. 
22If McCloskey's way of thinking seems preferable, one could instead construct a frontier that inarks 
the tradeoff between the expected return and the probability of disaster; the results would be the same. 
For the theoretical a.ssu1nptions involved in mean variance analysis and other ways of analyzing risk, 
particularly in primitive econon1ies, see Nevvbery and Stiglitz [1981]. Despite their 'varnings about the 
dangers of inean-variance analysis, they end up using it because it provides a good approxiination. 
Using the approxiination is certainly justified for our returns sa1nplei because the single period returns 
are drawn from nearly nor1nal distributions. 
23McCloskey is certainly a\vare of the dangers of ignoring price fluctuations. In his sa1nplei price 
fluctuations can be safely neglected 1 since they are small relative to the output fluctuations. 
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of R. McCloskey avoids such difficulties by restricting his attention to short output series 
that run for only a few years, but such short output series, though they may be close to 
stationary, rob his estimates of precision. 24 Fortunately, our series of financial returns 
involve no such complications. They are stationary, even though the output series and 
the price series themselves are not. We can therefore employ the full 90 years of financial 
returns from the eighteenth century in order to sharpen the accuracy of our calculations. 
The returns circumvent another serious obstacle as well. If we restrict the calculation 
of R to a single crop such as wheat, then we overlook the effects of the crop rotation. 
But on<:e the other··crops·are included, R is·much higher. Suppose, for example, that 
we correlate the output for entire royages rather than for taques. For wheat alone (on 
the royages growing wheat simultaneously), the correlations average 0.714; for oats, they 
average 0.757. But if we correlate not just wheat or oats but the entire output for the 
royages on the same crop rotation, then the average correlation jumps to over 0.95. 
It is the alternation of crops and fallow that is responsible for the increase. Because 
each crop has a different a.verage yield, the output correlation is pushed upward by the 
regular variation in average yields. It is boosted even higher by the fallow every third year. 
One could limit one's attention to a single crop and thereby ignore the crop rotation's 
effect on output, but that would be tantamount to underestimating Rand overestimating 
the value of scattering. 25 With the financial return series, by contrast, no such difficulties 
arise. Unlike the output series, the returns take into account wheat, oats, and fallow as 
well, for they measure each year's financial contribution, whatever the crop. That is a 
powerful argument in their favor. 
To use the returns, we recast the landholder's dilemma as a portfolio problem, imag-
ining that the landlord ca.res only about high mean returns and low return variances. 
He will then arrange his holdings so that, at any given level of return for his entire land 
portfolio, his return variance will be minimized. In ma.thema.tica.l terms, the landowner 











24McCloskey argues that correlating short output series fits the peasants' own expectations, but the 
peasants of course were not correlating any series, short or long. They evaluated scattering not by 
calculating correlations but by looking to their experience, experience that may have passed from father 
to son and stretched over generations. Our task is quite different: to deter1nine 1vhether scattering had 
any benefits by measuring para.meters such as R as accurately as possible. The accuracy is easier to 
achieve with long output series. 
25 McCloskey's solution to the problem is to use correlations of different crops such as y.,rheat and oats, 
but in doing so, he overlooks the alternation of fallow. 
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for each component Wi of w. Here w is a vector of portfolio weights telling what fraction 
of his property lies in each parcel where he can own land, ~ is the variance-covariance 
matrix of financial returns for all the parcels, z is the vector of expected returns for the 
parcels, andµ is the expected return of his entire portfolio. Constraint ( 4) simply means 
that the weights sum to 1, while (6) says that the weights must be non-negative-in the 
language of finance, the landowner cannot sell short his assets. Given a return µ on 
his portfolio, equation (5) implies that the landowner chooses weights w to minimize 
the return variance (3). He does so, it is worth stressing, whatever his own tastes and 
attitude toward risk. There are of course a number of solutions to the minimization 
problem. The solutions trace out a surface known as the mean-variance efficient frontier, 
and given the landlord's own level of risk aversion, he simply chooses the µ and the w 
on the mean-variance efficient frontier that maximize his own expected utility. 26 Our 
formulation of the landowner's problem thus allows for great differences in tastes and in 
attitudes toward risk. 
Ideally, we would like to solve problem (3) for each taque and allow the landowner 
to spread his land out over all 27 taques. Working with all 27 taques, though, obscures 
the results without changing any of the conclusions. We shall therefore restrict ourselves 
to a choice among smaller groups of taques and among the six royages in Onnaing and 
Quarouble. Despite the restriction, we can still determine whether the optimal portfolios-
those along the mean-variance efficient frontier-are scattered and whether scattering 
really does contribute to reducing the portfolio variance. 27 
The first step in the portfolio analysis is to convert the grain yield figures into series 
of returns for each taque, or for each royage if we are solving the portfolio problem 
for the royages. Ideally, the returns should incorporate the total revenue and the total 
costs incurred on a given taque or royage, with revenues and costs based on the market 
prices of grain, land, labor, and capital. Unfortunately, despite efforts to find better 
data, some of our price series are far from perfect. Our series of returns are thus only 
approximations-albeit reasonable ones-to the actual returns. 
To calculate total revenue, we multiplied the wheat and oats output of ea.ch ta.que 
or royage by the price of wheat and oats in the city of Montcliclier. Montcliclier lay 
100 kilometers from Onnaing and Qua.rouble, but it proved impossible to find usea.ble 
price series for closer markets. Prices proved unreliable in Valenciennes, which was only 4 
kilometers from Onnaing and Qua.rouble, and the same was true in other nearby markets, 
such as Douai and Lille. In the encl, Montclidier was the closest market whose prices could 
be trusted; although the distance from Montcliclier to Onnaing and Quarouble was not 
small, the Montclidier price and that in Onnaing and Qua.rouble appear to have been 
closely correlated. 28 
26For a discussion of portfolio analysis, see Markowitz [1987]. In our case, the portfolio \veights are 
non-negative, and riskless borro\ving and lending are not possible. Under these conditions, the inean-
variance frontier is a set of parabolic sections with kinks at the joints. The number of kinks equals the 
number of portfolio weights that equal zero. See Dybvig [1984] for details. 
27 Calculations for all 27 taques are available from the authors; they do not change the results. 
28The Valenciennes prices \vould see1n the obvious ones to use for the t1vo villages, because Valenciennes 
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To calculate total costs, we began with estimated labor inputs derived by George 
Grantham. The numbers we used were those Grantham gives for the region that included 
Onnaing and Quarouble - the French department of the Nord (Table 2). 29 The next step 
was to combine Grantham's labor inputs with an appropriate local wage series in order 
to compute total labor costs, but finding such a series proved difficult. The regional 
archives (the departmental archives of the Nord) did not seem to have a suitable source 
for eighteenth-century unskilled wages-wages paid in cash with tasks specified-and no 
appropriate published series exists for the region. We were therefore forced to rely on 
the wages of unskilled laborers in Paris. As could be expected, Parisian wages were 
higher than those in the-countryside near Onnaing and Quarouble: eighteenth-century 
evidence suggested that Onnaing and Quarouble wages ran only 65 percent of what they 
did in Paris. We therefore set our wage series equal to 65 percent of the Parisian senes; 
variations in this figure led to similar results. 30 
was practically next door. Some seventeenth-century prices from Valenciennes a.re published in Marineau 
[1971 ], p. 103, but the published series stops before our own period, the eighteenth century. While 
additional prices for the eighteenth-century may well exist in the manuscript Marineau used, the prices 
from Valenciennes leave much to be desired. In the first place, the units for oats are not entirely clear (on 
this, see Sivery [1977], pp. 64-65) 1 and 1 worse yet, the prices seem suspiciously repetitive, particularly 
after 1650. Prices series fro1n other nearby markets suffered from even more serious problems. In Douai 
and Lille-the two other obvious inarkets-intractable problems with units and monetary conversions 
rendered available price series useless. That left Montdidier as the closest market v.rith reliable prices-
slightly closer than Charleville and 1nuch closer than Abbeville. The Montdidier prices did correlate 
highly with the available Valenciennes prices (r = 0.70 for wheat, 0.50 for oats, 0.69 for wheat when 
differenced, 0.36 for oats v.rhen differenced), and their movement see1ned particularly close before 1650, 
\Vhen the Valenciennes prices seemed inore reliable. The Montdidier prices are ta.ken fro1n de Beauville 
[1875] 2:501. 
29Grantham [1991], pp. 8-10. We use Grantham's estimates for stiff soils circa 1750. Grantham's 
figure for threshing con1bines an esti1nate of the time required for threshing a hectoliter of grain and a 
figure for average yields. He reports that threshing operations consumed one 1nan day per hectoliter of 
output and that average yields in the Nord were seventeen hectoliters per hectare. Since we already have 
yield estimates, we multiply our yields by Grantham's man days per hectoliter estimate in calculating 
our costs for threshing. 
Labor inputs for oats were not exactly the same as for wheat, which benefitted from more manure and 
more plowing. Grantha1n attributed fallow plowing and manuring operations (both of v.rhich ca1ne after 
the oats but before the \vheat) to \vheat production. In constructing our returns) we treated oats in two 
different ways. The first assu1nes the sa1ne a1nount of plowing for oats as for >vheat and the second places 
plowing used in oat production at half of Grantham's wheat plowing input figure. In both cases, all 
manuring operations were attributed to wheat and none to oats. The results presented here will be for 
the returns figures con1puted assun1ing the same plowing for oat production) although our conclusions 
hold up regardless of which oat return measure is employed. Harvesting costs were assumed to be the 
saine for both crops, for in contrast to most parts of France, the scythe was used for both wheat and 
oats in the Nord in the eighteenth century. Threshing oats took slightly less time but the differences 
were small enough to ignore. For details, see Meuvret [1977-88], 1(Texte):166-69, 1 (Notes): 175, note 
11; Tessier [1787-1821] s.v. "Battage". 
30 Guignet [1977] (p. 566) contains wages for female lace makers in Valenciennes, but we need the 
wages of unskilled males. Furthermore, his series only covers the years 17 48-177 4. The evidence that 
local wages were 65 percent of those in Paris comes from a variety of sources. Young [1931] reported 
that wages were 0.6 livre/day in Picardie, which lay between Paris and the Hainault. Paris wages at the 
time \Vere near 1.25 livre/day, suggesting that countryside wages were only fifty percent of Paris wages. 
Deyon [1967] noted that workers in the city of Amiens, also between Paris and the Hainault, received 0.6 
livre/day in 1700-20. Paris wages during this period were hovering just below 1 livre/day. In the 1720s 
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Capital costs posed similar problems because there was no local price series for the 
major component of agricultural capital - livestock. The only recourse was to use ac~ 
counting information from the Paris Basin, where agricultural technology was similar. 
There the rental cost of capital did not vary greatly in the eighteenth century, and the 
accounting information suggests that it absorbed about 22 percent of total costs. Our 
capital costs we assumed to be the same.31 
To figure the cost of land required a local land rental series, but such a series proved 
impossible to find. The local ecclesiastical archives-typically the best source for rental 
data - contained only isolated leases for Onnaing and Quarouble and lacked anything 
like a rental series for the two villages. Tax records shed no light on the rental rate of 
land either; worse yet, much of the regional lease information was contaminated by the 
custom known as mauvais gre, which restricted rent increases and kept the rental rates 
stated in leases below the market price of land. The only alternative was to rely upon a 
decennial rent series from 34 villages in the vicinity of the city of Amiens. On average, 
these villages lay slightly over 100 kilometers from Onnaing and Quarouble, and their 
rent levels were lower than in Onnaing and Quarouble. In fact, the few useable leases we 
did find from Onnaing and Qua.rouble implied that rent in the 34 villages was lower by a 
factor of approximately 2.5. We therefore multiplied the time series from the 34 villages 
by 2.5 to give us an overall rental trend and corrected for differences in land quality 
among taques in Onnaing and Quarouble via differences in average yields. Changing the 
2.5 sea.le factor did not disturb our results.32 
Given total revenues and total costs, it is easy to calculate a rate of return. For a 
farmer renting a. portion of a given ta.que or roya.ge, it is: 
return 
total revenue - total costs 
land rent + total costs (7) 
The return is the same, it should be noted, whether the farmer rents the whole taque or 
merely a portion of it. More important for our purposes, though, is the rate of return for 
Deyon estimated ¥.rages in A1niens to be 0.8 livre/day while Paris wages were so1newhat over l livre/day. 
Deyon suggests that wages in the countryside around Amiens were 10¥.'er than these estimates. Lefebvre 
[1959] estimated wages for unskilled laborers in the Nord during the 1780s at about 0.625 livre/day if one 
takes into account board usually granted to agricultural laborers in this area. Given these estimates, 65 
percent of Paris 'vages see1ned a not inappropriate estimate for Onnaing and Qua.rouble. In any event, 
our conclusions are not sensitive to the 65 percent scale factor. V\Te tried scale factors ranging from 55 
to 75 percent; our results were not greatly changed. 
31 The capital share here is net of seed; it did not vary greatly in the eighteenth century. See Hoff1nan 
[1991b] and Hoffman [1991a] (pp. 27-32). 
32 For mauvais gre and the rental market, see Lefebvre [1959] and Hoffman [1991]. The correlation 
matrix of returns (the key to our analysis) is largely unaffected by our choice of the 2.5 rental scale 
factor. Indeed, multiplying the Amien rent series by anywhere from one to three changes none of our 
conclusions. To adjust for land quality differences within the villages, we co1nputed the average output 
on each taque or royage over the ninety years for which we had tithe data. We then divided each of 
these average output figures by Grantha1n's estimate of average output for the department of the Nord 
in 1750 (17 hectoliters per hectare). For each taque or royage, this provided an individual scale factor 
which was multiplied by the rental tin1e series constructed for Onnaing and Qua.rouble. 
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a landowner who farms his own property. To calculate it, we assumed that land rented 
for 4 percent of its sale price, as was common in the eighteenth century, and simply 
multiplied our rental figures by 25 to get a sales price series. The owner's rate of return 
is then: 
return 
total revenue - total costs 
land price + total costs (8) 
We omitted changes in the price of land from (8) because they proved to be negligible. 
The resulting average financial returns are listed by royage in Table 3. 
The returns, of course, are approximations, and one might rightly worry about their 
accuracy. A simple way to check them is to calculate the ratio of profits to land rents: 
total revenue - total costs 
land rent (9) 
If the revenues and costs are accurate, then the returns will be accurate too. But the 
difference between revenues and costs will be profits. With a competitive rental market 
for land, the profits will be siphoned off by landlords, leaving the ratio (9) close to one. 
If the ratio is indeed close to one, it will lend credence to the returns. Ratios for each 
royage appear in Table 4. 
Although the ratio exceeds one on each royage, it does so by only a small margin. 
The excess might reflect slight errors in the prices or land values or - more likely still -
entrepreneurial profits, which would prevent all the earnings from flowing to the land-
lord. In addition, the land market might not have been perfectly competitive because 
of mauvais gre; if so, the ratio would remain well above one.33 In any event, the ratio 
is close enough to one to support confidence in the financial returns. Also supportive of 
the returns is their level. For owners they in fa.ct hover close to the rate prevailing on 
long term loans - further evidence in their favor. 
Once calculated for each taque and royage, the returns make clear the benefits of 
holding separate plots of land. A landowner, for example, could cut his risks drastically 
merely by spreading his holdings among the six royages. To see why it suffices to solve 
the portfolio problem (3) for the royages. 
For various portfolio returns µ, we can calculate the portfolio weights that minimize 
the landlord's portfolio variance and thereby trace out points along the mean-variance 
efficient frontier; a number of such points are listed in Table 5 and depicted in Figure 
1. From the frontier, it is obvious that farming different royages greatly reduced the 
33We compute returns not only for royages, but also for the individual taques that co1nprise royage 3 
(in Onnaing) and royage 6 (in Quarouble). The average of the ratio test is 1.19 for the taques in royage 
3 and 1.28 for those in roya.ge 6. 
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portfolio variance. To achieve an expected return of 0.055, for example, a landowner 
could consolidate all his holdings in royage one in Onnaing; his portfolio would then 
have a variance of .004297. Were he instead to adopt a mean-varia.nce efficient portfolio, 
he would spread his holdings according to the weights shown in Table 6, opposite the 
expected return of 0.055. He would then own land in roya.ges one, three, four, five, 
and six, and his portfolio variance would fall to .000753. Compared to the portfolio 
consolidated in roya.ge one, the variance would have dropped 82.5 percent. 
At first glance, the dramatically lower variance might appear to support McCloskey's 
argument about scattering, but a closedook at the evidence suggests otherwise. What we 
have to examine are the correlations between the financial returns of the various royages. 
When the correlations a.re low or negative, the landowner can indeed cut his portfolio 
variance by scattering his holdings. But when they are highly correlated, scattering does 
little to spread his risk. 
For the roya.ges, the returns correlations are either over 0.97 - and hence far too high 
- or else negative (Table 6). If scattering really did reduce risks, then why would some 
of the correlations be nearly one? Such high correlations might be understandable for 
royages within the same village, where the effects of scattering would be muted, but the 
pairs of royages with high correlations (roya.ges one and four, roya.ges two and five, and 
royages three and six) a.II lay in different villages. In separate villages, where the effects 
of scattering would presumably be most pronounced, the correlations should be low or 
negative, but certainly not above 0.97. 
To be sure, there a.re other royages with negative correlations. But what distinguished 
them was not scattering but the crops they grew. In every case, if a pair of royages had 
a. negative correlation, then the roya.ges grew different crops. In Onna.ing, for example, 
royages one and two were never sown with the same crops: they marched through the 
crop rotation one year a.pa.rt. Their return correlation was -0.242. Like roya.ges one and 
two, many of the roya.ges with negative correlation lay in the same village. The same 
was true of roya.ges four, five, and six in Quarouble. If McCloskey's argument about 
scattering were correct, the correlations would not dip so low for royages within a. single 
village. 
Apparently, what did reduce risk was not scattering but the crop diversification in-
herent in the three-field system. The royages with low correlations never grew the same 
crops. Those with high correlations (roya.ges one and four, two and five, and three and 
six) always did (Table 6). \"lhether the royages were in different villages mattered little 
- contrary to what McCloskey's argument would lead us to expect. After all, if he were 
correct, the correlations should have been consistently high for royages in the same village 
and consistently low for royages in different villa.ges. 34 It is clear that a. landowner did 
34McCloskey does not deny the i1nportance of growing different crops1 and he 1night rightly argue that 
both scattering and crop diversification reduced risk. The issue then is whether scattering provided much 
additional insurance. If it did, then 1ve could detect the effect of scattering by looking at the returns 
correlations between royages gro1ving different crops. These correlations should be inuch lower vvhen the 
royages a.re in different villages and the effect of scattering is more pronounced. For our roya.ges 1 though 1 
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not have to scatter his fields wildly to reduce his risk; rather, he simply had to farm land 
in each of the three parts of the crop rotation. The crop rotation gave him the necessary 
crop diversification, and he did not have to sow dozens of additional crops. 
Here McCloskey might counter that scattering across royages is not a fair test. The 
royages, he might say, were too large and heterogeneous. Encompassing a wide variety of 
soils, they would already have exhausted the benefits of scattering. If so, then little would 
be gained by holding land in different royages, beyond the benefits of crop diversification. 
Our results, he might conclude, would come as no surprise. 
Yet it is not so easy to dismiss the evidence from the royages. If they seem too large 
- keep in mind that they are hardly larger than the manorial farms McCloskey himself 
uses - then the analysis can be repeated for the taques, which are certainly small enough 
to reveal the benefits of scattering. And if scattering mattered, independently of crop 
diversification, then its benefits should stand out even on taques sown with the same 
crops. In other words, a landowner should be able to reduce his portfolio's variance by 
spreading his holdings across different taques, and he should be able to do so even if the 
taques grew identical crops. 
Was this possible on the taques? Consider, for example, the taques in royage three 
in Onnaing. They all grew the same crops, year in and year out. If the royages were 
indeed large and heterogeneous, then the six taques in royage three must have offered 
considerable opportunity for diversification by scattering alone. The returns correlations 
suggest, however, that these taques provided little in the way of insurance. Although 
their returns correlations are not as close to one as some from the royages, they are 
still quite high: they range from 0.743 to 0.960 (Table 7). None are negative. And the 
correlations are just as large for the other taques that grow the same crops - for instance, 
those in royage six in Qua.rouble. 
There is another way to appreciate how meager were the benefits to scattering across 
the taques in royage three: solving the portfolio problem. If we solve it for a landowner 
who can divide his holdings among these taques, we quickly see how little insurance 
scattering brings in the absence of crop diversification (Table 8). The solution with the 
lowest possible variance - one that might appeal to an ultra cautious landowner - ha.cl 
an expected return of 0.412 and a variance of .002467. It was scattered, but one could 
do almost as well without any scattering at all, simply by holding land in a single taque, 
taque five, which returned .0404 and ha.cl a variance of .00253. Similarly a landowner 
could concentrate his land in taque three and achieve a return of .0507 and a variance 
of .004194. To get a similar return (:0505) along the mean variance frontier, he would 
have to scatter his holdings over three taques, yet his portfolio variance would diminish 
only slightly to .00394:3. Gone were the gigantic reductions in variance that a landowner 
could enjoy by holding different roya.ges and diversifying his crops! 
they are hardly lower at all: they average -0.230 for royages in the same village and -0.233 for different 
villages 1 1Nhich suggests that scattering's contribution 'Na.s minimal. Output correlations for taques lead 
to the sa1ne conclusion. 
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One might argue that limiting the landowner to the taques in royage three is too 
restrictive. Why not let him range over the eleven taques in royages three and six? 
Although they all grew the same crops, they spread over two villages and so offered 
ample opportunity for scattering to work its supposed magic. Yet adding the five extra 
taques from royage six did little to reduce the portfolio variance (Figure 2). Usually it 
declined by only 5 or 6 percent with the addition of the extra taques, even though they 
allowed the landowner to hold land in Quarouble instead of just Onnaing. 35 
Not that scattering was completely ineffective. If we consider the portfolios made 
up or land from the taques in royage three, we see that many along the mean-variance 
efficient frontier involved some scattering (Table 8). Furthermore, holding a scattered 
portfolio was clearly superior to concentrating one's land in a plot such as taque four. 36 
But by and large, scattering did little to reduce the portfolio's variance, and as insurance 
it paled to insignificance besides crop diversification. After all, a landowner could protect 
himself simply by rotating his crops; he did not have to scatter his fields. 
If scattering provided so little insurance, why did it persist? The answer may lie with 
Fenoaltea's ideas, revised to take into account the imperfections of the pre-industrial 
labor market. Or it may lie with the workings of the land market, as Bruce Campbell 
has proposed.37 But for the moment scattering remains what it has long been, a matter 
of mystery. 
35The royage six taques did contribute so1newhat more at higher rates of return. With only taques 
from royage three, for exa1nple, the highest achievable expected return \Vas .0534 \vith a .006073 variance. 
With the addition of taques fro1n royage six1 the optimal portfolio of assets with nearly the saine return 
(.0535) included land in taques three, six, seven, and nine; its variance was .04738, some 22 percent 
below that of the portfolio restricted to the taques from royage three. 
36In equilibrium, the price of taque four would presumably decline enough so that it too 1vould be 
held. Our imputed rent on taque four is probably too high and the return too low - a sign that we 
undoubtedly erred slightly in correcting for rent differences among the taques. Such errors, though, 
should not disturb our results, because the returns correlations matrix would remain nearly the same. 
37Campbell [1980]. He attributes scattering at least in part to the workings of the land market, but 
he fails to explain why buyers did not prefer consolidated holdings. If they did, then the land market 
should have led to concentration, unless it \Vas obstructed by so1ne intriguing iinperfection. 
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Table 1. Wheat Yield Correlations 1701-1790 
Average correlation 
Number of pairs 
Standard deviation 
Source: Marineau [1971] 





Pairs with one taque in 





Note: The wheat yield correlations are averaged over all pairs of taques growing wheat 
simultaneously including the espiliers. Both here and in all subsequent calculations, data 
from 1740 were eliminated because the 1740 tithe was commuted to a monetary payment. 
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Table 2. Labor Inputs 





Source: George Grantham, 1991. 
Note: In Grantham's calculations, wheat farming requires labor for four tasks: pre-
harvest operations, manuring, harvesting, and threshing. Pre-harvest operations cover 
plowing, harrowing, sowing, and weeding. Manuring includes loading manure, transport-
ing it to fields and then spreading it. Harvesting comprises cutting, binding, stooking, 
and transporting output from fields. 
The figure for threshing is actually a combination of two of Grantham's other esti-
mates. He argues that threshing required 1 manday of labor per hectolitre. He gives 
the average yield on fields in the department of the Nord as 17 hectolitres per hectare. 
Multiplying these two numbers yields an estimate of the average labor input per hectare 
associated with threshing in the Nord. For our returns, we computed the labor inputs 
associated with threshing by multiplying the output on each of our fields (measured 
in hectolitres per hectare) by Grantham's estimate of 1 manday of labor per hectolitre 
threshed. 
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Table 3. Average Return on each Royage 1701-1790 
Owner's Return 
Return St. Dev. Variance 
royagel .0550 .06555 .004297 
royage2 .0564 .06741 .004544 
royage3 .0488 .06455 .004167 
royage4 .0572 .06551 .004292 
royage5 .0585 .06478 .004197 
royage6 .0533 .07160 .005126 
Renter's Return 
Return St. Dev. Variance 
royagel .1893 .559460 .312995 
royage2 .1998 .549291 .301720 
royage3 .1439 .507234 .257286 
royage4 .2351 .590245 .348389 
royage5 .2531 .566378 .320784 
royage6 .2049 .609967 .372059 
Source: See Text 
Note: Royages one, two, and three were in the village of Onnaing; four, five, and six 
were in Quarouble. 
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weighted avg 1.328 
Source: See text 
Note: For locations of the royages see table 3. 
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Table 5: Mean-Variance Efficient Portfolios, Royages 
Portfolio Weights by Royage 
Exp. mean vanance 1 2 3 4 5 6 
.0543 .000738 .233 .078 .326 .110 .254 .000 
.0546 .000740 .185 .000 .314 .163 .338 .000 
.0550 .000753 .103 .000 .274 .249 .347 .027 
.0554 .000769 .092 .000 .201 .262 .352 .093 
.0558 .000788 .080 .000 .125 .275 .358 .161 
.0562 .000810 .069 .000 .049 .288 .363 .230 
.0564 .000820 .064 .000 .019 .294 .365 .258 
.0566 .000836 .002 .000 .000 .357 .369 .272 
.0570 .000927 .000 .000 .000 .378 .430 .192 
.0572 .000994 .000 .000 .000 .386 .453 .161 
.0574 .001141 .000 .000 .000 .398 .492 .110 
.0578 .001477 .000 .000 .000 .418 .553 .028 
.0582 .002301 .000 .000 .000 .234 .766 .000 
.0585 .004196 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.00 .000 
Source: See text 
Note: For the locations of the royages see table 3. Exp mean is the expected portfolio 
return µ; the variance is the total portfolio variance w'Ew; and the weights give the 
portion of land Wi held in each royage. 
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Table 6: Returns Correlation Matrix 
Royages 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
royagel 1.00 
royage2 -.242 1.00 
royage3 -.231 -.243 1.00 
royage4 .970 -.211 -.254 1.00 
royage5 -.295 .973 -.180 -.260 1.00 
royage6 -.202 -.255 .978 -.215 -.191 1.00 
Source: See text 
Note: Royages 1,2, and 3 were in Onnaing; 4,5, and 6 in Quarouble. Royages 1 and 4 
grew the same crop. So did 2 and 5, and 3 and 6. 
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Table 7: Returns Correlation Matrix 
Taques in Royage 3, Onnaing 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
taque 1 1.00 
ta.que 2 .925 1.00 
taque 3 .877 .960 1.00 
taque 4 .920 .797 .743 1.00 
ta.que 5 .816 .799 .811 .746 1.00 
ta.que 6 .868 .890 .873 .749 .866 1.00 
Source: See text 
Note: All ta.ques in royage 3 grew the same crops. 
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Table 8: Mean-Variance Efficient Portfolios 
Taques in Royage 3. 
Royage 3 Portfolio Weights by Taque 
Exp. mean var1a11ce 1 2 3 4 5 6 
.0412 .002467 .000 .232 .000 .000 .768 .000 
.0415 .002472 .000 .297 .000 .000 .703 .000 
.0425 .002530 .000 .255 .000 .000 .588 .157 
.0435 .002614 .000 .211 .000 .000 .475 .315 
.0445 .002724 .000 .131 .056 .000 .403 .411 
.0455 .002845 .000 .026 .151 .000 .358 .464 
.0465 .002980 .000 .000 .216 .000 .262 .522 
.0475 .003138 .000 .000 .272 .000 .149 .580 
.0485 .003312 .000 .000 .327 .000 .035 .637 
.0495 .003565 .023 .000 .530 .000 .000 .446 
.0505 .003943 .171 .000 .584 .000 .000 .245 
.0515 .004415 .318 .000 .638 .000 .000 .044 
.0525 .005072 .640 .000 .360 .000 .000 .000 
.0534 .006073 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Source: See text 
Note: The mean returns, and the portfolio variances have the same meaning as in 
table 5, but the portfolio now consists of land in the taques of royage 3. The portfolio 
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